Effects of Judge Expectations in Turing Test by Pech Jiří
Bachelor’s Thesis
Czech
Technical
University
in Prague
F3 Faculty of Electrical EngineeringDepartment of Cybernetics
Effects of Judge Expectations in
Turing Test
Jiří Pech
Cybernetics and robotics
December 2014
Supervisor: prof. Kevin Warwick, Ph.D.





Acknowledgement / Declaration
I would like to express my gratitude
to my supervisor prof. Kevin Warwick,
Ph.D for all the support he has pro-
vided me with and for his continuous
work towards the advancement of arti-
ficial intelligence. I also wish to thank
my friend Casey Stern and his mother
Elaine who tackled the strenuous work
of correcting my grammar and reor-
ganizing the sentences that only made
sense in my head. Last but not least,
I thank my parents for being patient
with me whenever I got annoyed that
the house was not quiet enough for me
to write.
I hereby declare that I have complet-
ed this thesis independently and that
all the used sources are included in the
list of references, in accordance with the
Methodological Instructions on Ethical
Principles in the Preparation of Univer-
sity Theses.
In Prague, December 5th, 2014
Prohlašuji, že jsem předloženou prá-
ci vypracoval samostatně a že jsem
uvedl veškeré použité informační zdroje
v souladu s Metodickým pokynem o do-
držování etických principů při přípravě
vysokoškolských závěrečných prací.
V Praze dne 5. 12. 2014
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
vii
Abstrakt / Abstract
Tato práce se zabývá případy, kdy
rozporuplná rozhodnutí vyšetřovatelů v
Turingových testech vedla k chybnému
zařazení skrytých bytostí. Práce pre-
zentuje přepisy konverzací, ve kterých
lidští soudci podlehli svým subjektiv-
ním očekáváním lidského chování a
mylně zařadili člověka jako stroj či stroj
jako člověka. Chybné předpoklady o
skutečné povaze skrytých bytostí, které
vyšetřovatelé učinili na základě něja-
kého svého osobního očekávání, jsou
především středem zájmu. Strategie
skrytých osob a strojů, které nějaké
takovéto soudcovské očekávání využí-
vají ve svůj prospěch, nebo kvůli němu
z nějakého důvodu utrpěly, jsou též
pozorování hodné. Jako příklady jsou
zde uvedeny přepisy testů z testování
pořádaného 23. června 2012 v Bletchley
parku v Anglii. Text je rozdělena do tří
částí, které mají každá svůj vlastní účel.
První část je jednoduchým představe-
ním konceptu Turingova testu, druhá
a hlavní část se zabývá právě tématem
očekávání vyšetřovatelů a třetí část
popisuje sadu praktických Turingových
testů, zorganizovaných autorem této
práce.
Klíčová slova: Turingův test; imitační
hra; chatboti; očekávání poroty;
Překlad titulu: Vliv očekávání poroty
na výsledek Turingova testu
This thesis presents cases of ques-
tionable decisions exhibited by the
interrogators, often resulting in misiden-
tification of hidden entities, in practical
Turing Tests. The paper presents tran-
scripts of conversations in which human
judges succumbed to their subjective
expectations of human behavior and
misidentified both humans as machines
and machines as humans. Of inter-
est are misguided assumptions about
the entity’s nature, made by the in-
terrogators, based upon their personal
preconceptions. The performance of
machines or hidden humans is of inter-
est if it appears to be directly linked to
the judge’s preconception, either suffer-
ing from it or utilizing it to the entity’s
purpose. Full unedited transcripts from
the 23rd June 2012 Bletchley Park,
England event are examined here as ex-
amples. The paper is divided into three
parts, each aimed at a different goal.
The first part is a simple introduction
of the concept of a Turing Test, the
second and main part deals with the
judges’ expectations and the final, third
part, describes a practical Turing Test
event organized by the author.
Keywords: Turing test; imitation
game; chatbots; judge expectations;
confederate effect; machine misidentifi-
cation,
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1950, science fiction author Isaac Asimov published a collection of nine short stories
called I, Robot. The book featured machines capable of thought, decision making and
even feelings – skills endowed upon them through complex programming that included
a firm set of behavioral rules. Part of a rising trend, his work, like that of a number
of other authors of the time, ranged over all types of media, and captured readers’
imaginations by presenting the question: Can Machines Think?
During the same year, a British mathematician and leader of the team of scientists
credited for decrypting the German Enigma coding machine, Alan Turing, published a
paper of a more practical nature titled ‘Computing, Machinery and Intelligence’[1] in
which he proposed a test that would allow him to rephrase the question so it could be
answered. Unconvinced that such a query could or should be answered via a statistical
survey such as a Gallup poll1), he decided to modify a popular parlour game called
the ‘Imitation Game’ in such a way that it would be interchangeable with the original
question.
The Imitation Game is designed for three people: two hidden ‘players’, one male and
one female, and one ‘interrogator’ of either sex. The players are divided into three
separate rooms for the sake of anonymity. Clear instructions are given to each of the
participants. The interrogator is to decide, or to be more accurate, ‘judge’, based on
a conversation with the other players, which of the two is the male and which is the
female. The male is instructed to try and pass himself off as the female, whereas the
female’s goal is to be classified correctly, that is to say, as a female. Importantly, the
conversation should be in a typewritten form, ideally done on a computer, in order to
deny the interrogator any form of visual or audio aid.
Based on the rules of the game, it is quite obvious that for the male player to win, he
must appear more female than the female player. Alan Turing proposed a rather radical
change to the game where he considered what would happen to the outcome should one
of the players, specifically the one in the role of the male, be replaced by a machine.
It would then be the machine’s goal to be classified as a human when pitted against
a hidden human of either sex. Turing theorised that if the machine could convince a
certain number of human judges that it (the machine) was human, then the machine
could be considered to have intelligence.
It is this modified version of the Imitation Game, along with a set of additional rules
listed in Chapter 2, that has become known as ‘The Turing Test’2). Many opposing
views on the test have surfaced since its publication in 1950. Some consider it a valuable
assessment of machine thinking and an important achievement in the understanding of
1) Research on what humans around the world think and feel. www.gallup.com
2) Author’s Note: Within the context of Turing’s construct, the words ’interrogator’ and ’judge’ are by and
large synonymous, as are ’test’ and ’game’. As such, these terms are used interchangeably throughout this
paper
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artificial intelligence, or ‘AI’ [2], whereas others see it as a danger and an obstruction
to AI’s progress [3–4]. In fact, even Alan Turing himself raised several well-formulated
arguments ranging from mathematical to theological in the very paper where he pro-
posed the test [1]. He attempted to answer some of them to the degree he believed
satisfactory, and chose to dismiss others as insubstantial. One of his arguments, how-
ever, although in a somewhat roundabout fashion, touched on the topic of this thesis,
and therefore will be discussed here in a greater detail.
In a word, it is the argument of ‘consciousness’[1]. In it, Turing quotes Professor
Geoffrey Jefferson’s ‘Lister Oration of 1949’:
“Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and
emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals
brain – that is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No mechanism could
feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its successes,
grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes,
be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get what it wants.”[5][1]
- Geoffrey Jefferson
In the most extreme case of this argument, Turing then considers the solipsist view that
“to be sure that a machine thinks is to be that machine and to feel oneself thinking”.
That is, in a more general interpretation, to say that “to know what a man thinks is to
be that particular man” — a notable point to think about when analysing transcripts
of actual tests. One could argue that the same might be said of any participant in the
Imitation Game.
Turing answers the argument of consciousness with the polite convention that, for the
sake of simplicity: all people think. One should, however, keep in mind that to judge
another, one has only his own self as a standard. This concept, and its implications
vis-à-vis Turing Test results, forms the basis of this paper. Explicitly stated:
Any judgement an interrogator makes is based upon his own specific factual knowl-
edge and unique personal experience as to what it means ‘to be’. It is therefore
quite conceivable that an interrogator in a Turing Test might let his expectations of
human-like behaviour impede his judgement when faced with behavioural patterns
outside his own experience.
In order to determine the truthfulness and extent of such a suspicion, certain judg-
ments have been selected for further examination. These include instances where the
interrogator’s judgment appears to be clouded by personal experience, expectations, or
behavioral standards, and/or those where his or her assumptions of factual knowledge
seem to come into play. Note that even transcripts of tests where a correct classification
has been made have been considered for selection when parts of the conversation were
deemed of interest. However, as a biased decision is difficult to pinpoint in a successful
(correctly classified) game, no tests resulting in a correct classification were selected in
the end. This does not mean that a judge who classifies an entity correctly bears no
preconceptions; it simply indicates that his expectations have been fulfilled. The reason
why a judge reaches an incorrect decision, or which part of the conversation might have
lead to his misjudgement, will be identified and included in the discussion chapter.
This work is based on transcript analysis. The author did not have the privilege of
discussing the decisions and thought processes of the interrogators whose conversation
transcripts have been selected for the analysis chapter of this paper. All conclusions
2
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drawn here are therefore the personal opinion of the author and as such, although based
on extensive topic research, may not reflect the conclusions drawn by the reader. Since
the value and practicality of The Turing Test are still current topics of discussion, this
thesis is not meant to offer a conclusion, but rather to present and examine an area of
interest which, the author feels, has not yet been studied in satisfactory detail. That
area is the range of expectations a judge might have and their effects on the result of
a Turing test.
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Chapter 2
Turing’s Test: Rules and Roles
2.1 General rules
Almost all the tests chosen for examination in this paper come from the same event,
specifically the series of Turing Tests held at Bletchley Park, England on Saturday, the
23rd of June, 2012. The date and the location were both selected for their symbolic
meaning as the day marked the 100th anniversary of Alan Turing’s birth and the venue
was where his team broke the Enigma machine cipher. However, before the detailed
set-up used on this occasion is described any further, it is worth going over the general
ideas behind the game as put forth by Alan Turing during the course of his career, as
this establishes a basic image of what the test should look like.
During a 1952 BBC radio program, Turing proclaimed that “The idea of the test is
that a machine has to try and pretend to be a man, by answering questions put to it,
and it will only pass if the pretence is reasonably convincing. A considerable portion of
a jury, who should not be expert about machines, must be taken in by the pretence.”
[6] This description followed his more specific 1950 prediction: “I believe that in about
fifty years’ time it will be possible to programme computers, with a storage capacity of
about 109, to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator
will not have more than a 70 percent chance of making the right identification after
five minutes of questioning” [1]. (Notice Turing’s change in terminology from ‘average
interrogator’ or ‘judge’ in 1950 to ‘jury’ two years later. This was not incidental, and
the rationale behind it will be discussed later in this section.) It might also be of interest
that 65 years after Alan Turing first published his prediction, personal computers with
storage capacities of 1TB (1012) are commonly sold. But it wasn’t until last year (2014)
that the first machine, a chatterbot given the name Eugene Gootsman, officially passed
the Test.
In his original paper, Turing specifically prescribes two numerical figures. The first
concerns the time limit of the game, to be set at five minutes exactly. In other words,
the judge has precisely five minutes to question the entity, or entities (depending on
the type of test), and then the communication channel is terminated with no partial
sentences transmitted. Any lines sent within the time limit are in their final form and
cannot be retracted. Editing is only possible by further typing, so all wording and
spelling is exactly as produced by the participants. These original parameters were
indeed adhered to during the Bletchley Park event. Any spelling mistakes, intended or
not, on the test forms were not to be corrected, as shown in the transcripts presented
later in this paper. The time stamps alongside each utterance denote the actual times
(GMT) of transmission on the testing day. They, too, were visible to the judges should
they wish to draw conclusions from the speed of responses. It should be noted here that
there are those who, to this day, do not agree with the five minute time limit [7–8] and
who even stage tests of different durations [i.e. the Hugh Loebner Prize for Artificial
4
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intelligence]. However, as all the tests in this paper come from the 23rd June 2012,
Bletchley Park event, the five minute limit prescribed by Turing was satisfied.
His second condition stipulates that there be no more than a 70 percent chance that an
average interrogator will make the right identification at the end of the communication.
To make this easier to understand, it can be viewed as setting a limit of at least 30
percent of average interrogators being fooled by a machine for the machine to pass.
This means that at least 30 percent of the machine’s interrogators must either classify
it incorrectly (as human) or be unsure, if such an option exists, after concluding their
conversation. It may at first glance seem an easy task for the machine to have to fool
just 30 percent of a jury. But, considering what the machine must achieve to win, it
becomes obvious that the task is quite the opposite of easy. The following example
illustrates this more clearly.
Imagine a set of judges were asked to distribute 100 points between two entities based
on their humanness. A result of 50 and 50 would mean the judges were unsure of
what to decide, but anything else would suggest that one of the entities seemed, in the
judge’s opinion, more human than the other. When considered in a parallel test against
each other, each of the humans should achieve a success rate of exactly 50 percent. Any
other result would mean that the other human was deemed less human-like by the jury1).
Notice that a success rate of 50 percent does not indicate that a judge was unsure about
who is more human. The balance of points distributed amongst the two humans could
in fact differ quite wildly from judge to judge. The success rate of 50 percent means
that when all of the tests taken by these two entities are looked upon collectively, each
of the entities is judged to be more human in exactly half the cases. Following this
logic, an average human should not be able to convince the jury in more than half of
the tests that he or she is more human-like than his or her opponent (also an average
human). Bearing that in mind brings into perspective just how high the 30 percent bar
is for a machine. Not only does this mean that the machine must convince 30 percent
of the judges that it is human, it must convince them that it is even more human than
the human it is pitted against. Professor Kevin Warwick puts this very nicely in his
conference paper ‘Not another look at the Turing Test!’ noting, “The Turing test is
therefore quite a challenge in that a computer must fool interrogators that it is more
human than many humans.”[8] In fact, Alan Turing himself pointed out that the “...
game may perhaps be criticized on the ground that the odds are weighted too heavily
against the machine.”[1] Why any machine at all should be able to pass the test has
in large part to do with defining the terms ‘hidden human’ and ‘average interrogator’.
For example, a hidden human represented by a person suffering from autism could,
for obvious reasons, make it much easier for a machine to be judged human in a test
where the interrogator seeks humanness by eliciting an emotional response. Cases where
humans are classified as machines due to some mediating circumstance of this kind are
known, and their impact on test results is generally referred to as the ‘Confederate
Effect’. Although some such tests are incidentally included in this paper, they were not
chosen based on this particular property. (For more information on the topic, please
see [9].)
The term ‘average interrogator’ also presents something of a dilemma [8] since the
concept of ‘a statistically average person’ is wrought with cultural and other biases. It
is also why, as mentioned earlier in this paper, Turing changed his interrogator from
1) A jury’s deeming a human to be less human than a machine raises a completely different topic with its
own implications, most of which are not within the realm of this paper.
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a single judge to a ‘jury’, allowing for a panel of judges with a variety of personal
traits and technical experiences. Such a ‘jury’ could then even include judges who
know nothing about artificial intelligence or even fail to fully understand the task they
are charged to perform. Considering the affect of hidden human traits and judge/jury
biases, it becomes easier to understand why some machines might actually pass the
Turing’s test.
Another aspect of the Turing’s test is the testing format. There are two basic set-ups:
the viva voce test, or the one-on-one, and the simultaneous, three-participant, test. In
the viva voce test, the judge has a conversation with a single hidden entity and is asked
to determine whether he or she spoke to a human, a machine or is unsure. The judge
may also be asked to try and determine the age range, gender and whether or not the
entity is a native English speaker.
In the simultaneous test, the judge must divide his five minutes between two hidden
entities which may be (a) one machine and one human, (b) two humans or (c) two
machines. The judge sees these entities on a split screen on his display, and may choose
at will with which of them he or she wishes to converse at any given time. The entities
are not aware of each other, unless made so by the interrogator. It is then up to the
interrogator to determine which of the entities is more human-like. (Since it is not
relevant to the topic under discussion here the reader can decide for his or herself if the
testing format affects the results in any way.)
To summarize, in a standard Turing Test such as was held at Bletchley Park, one
interrogator and one or two hidden entities engage in a five-minute long conversation.
The conversation is abruptly terminated at the end of the five minutes and the judge is
asked to make a classification (human or not human) for all hidden entities involved in
the game. It is the goal of the entities to be classified as human regardless of what their
real nature actually is. In a viva voce test, the hidden entity simply aims to be classified
as human, whereas in the simultaneous test, an entity seeks to present itself as the more
human-like one of the two. This is the point where the Bletchley Park setup varies from
the Imitation Game as described in Turing’s original paper, where all three participants
see and lead one single conversation. In the Bletchley Park format, the judge questions
the entities in a parallel fashion but each within a separate conversation. Any machine
that is classified incorrectly (as human or unsure) by at least 30 percent of the jury has
passed Turing’s test. The individual strategies available to each participant, their roles
and their specific instructions, are described in the next chapter.
2.2 Specific rules and set-up
The practical set-up used on Saturday, 23 June 2012 at Bletchley Park, England is best
described in ‘Effects of lying in practical Turing tests’,in Chapter 2.3 titled ‘Set up’[10].
A total of one hundred and eighty tests were held during five sessions throughout the
day. Each session was divided into six rounds of four simultaneous and two viva voce
tests per round. A group of 30 human judges, 25 hidden humans and 5 machines
resulted in 180 tests featuring a different interviewer/interviewee combination each
time. The judges operated from a room separate from that of the hidden humans and
communicated with them via a computer. A simultaneous test was carried out as a
split screen conversation with one entity to the right and one to the left of the judges
monitor. All other rules, such as the timing and victory conditions, were as described
in the previous chapter.
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2.3 Roles
2.3.1 Hidden humans
The role of a hidden human does not entail having a goal to achieve in the Turing
test, which makes it a fairly simple one. Since humans are not the tested entity they
are instructed to behave as they ordinarily would during a typical conversation with a
stranger. It is desirable, however, to give them at least some instructions so they won’t
make the test too easy for the machines.For example, they are not to reveal their name
or any other personal details to the interviewer. They might be, for example, tasked to
introduce themselves as John or Joan if asked their name. Other than that, no other
restrictions are put on their responses. Turing recommended that a good strategy for
a hidden human would be to simply tell the truth, but he left this point as a mere
suggestion. The hidden humans may lie or in any other way deceive the interrogator if
they feel it is what they would normally do. Dishonesty is, after all, a significant part
of human interaction.
2.3.2 Machines
A machine has a much more challenging task to perform. It must convince a human
judge that it is also human. Alan Turning described the machine’s basic strategy as
“[trying] to pretend to be a man” [6]. Interpreting Turing’s intent in their 2014 paper,
researchers Warwick and Shah explain, “by ’man’ we believe Turing was generalizing,
and not specifying that only man should be imitated by the machine” [10]. In fact, in
order to ‘false-face’ humanness, the machine may use any technique at its disposal. It
may lie, pretend to be a specific human or even risk pretending to be a human acting
as a machine, a ploy that has proven to be surprisingly effective. As alluded to earlier,
a machine called Eugene Gootsman was quite successful by taking on the persona of
a 13 year-old Ukrainian boy. Fred Roberts, the developer of another machine, named
Elbot, even commented that “Elbot is prepared for typical inputs and induces users to
behave in a predictable manner”. This statement is especially interesting as Elbot not
only acknowledges that the judges bring preconceptions to bear based on what they
expect human responses to be, it goes so far as to use these expectations as its strategy
to steer the questioning in a sought-after direction. And as will be detailed in Chapter
3, like Eugene Gootsman, Elbot’s track record is impressive.
2.3.3 Interrogators
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, there are those who raise objections to
the Turing Test and even consider it to be harmful to AI’s progress. One such criticism
has been that “The imitation game conditions say nothing about the judge, but the
success of the game depends crucially on how clever, knowledgeable, and insightful the
judge is.” [4]. This is a point that is very important to this thesis, and the human traits
of the participant performing the role of a judge will be examined and discussed more
thoroughly in Chapter 3: Transcript Analysis. Firstly however, it is important to go
over what exactly the role entails.
The judge is a human tasked with questioning the hidden entities and deciding which of
them seems to be more human, or in case of the viva voce test, if the entity appears hu-
man at all. What the decision is based upon is entirely up to the judge, be it experience,
a hunch or a wild guess. The five minute conversation does not have any restrictions,
7
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so the judge is free to follow any line of questioning or focus on any topic within the
boundaries of polite conversation with a stranger. The judges are, in fact, informed that
there may be children among the hidden humans, so the conversation should maintain
at least some level of propriety. An attempt to discover the entity’s personal informa-
tion may not be forbidden, but it is certainly counterproductive because the aim is to
identify humanness, not an individual human being.
As mentioned previously, the Turing Test is designed to determine whether a machine
can think as a human does. A machine fooling a jury of AI experts would only be
proving that it can think as AI experts do. So the panel of judges must consist of
a wide variety of individuals, representing various levels of experience with chatbots,
the Turing test and technology in general. People of different ages, professions and
even intelligence are desirable because only in this way can the general population be
approximated.
In the next chapter, ten specific transcripts are presented. All but the last of these
transcripts come from the Benchley Park event. These test have been selected because
they contain interesting insights into conversations where the judges let their expecta-
tions and pre-conceptions cloud their judgement and lead them to incorrect decisions.
In some cases a single utterance by the entity appears to have changed the interroga-
tor’s opinion, despite other strong evidence of the entity’s nature.In others, the entity
deftly takes charge of the entire conversation, and sometimes it just seems to get lucky.
Regardless or what exactly takes place, though, all of the transcripts have one thing in
common: the machine fools the interrogator.
At the end of each transcript follows a discussion of the judge’s performance, attempt
at identification of their mistakes and a discussion of how these mistakes might have
been avoided and how the judge could have improved his or hers performance. Another
aspect also considered after each text is the performance of the hidden entity: whether
it caused the misclassification intentionally and if not, what a better strategy might
have been.
8
Chapter 3
Transcript analysis
Bear in mind that the transcripts presented in this paper have been selected and are
being examined with the express intention of identifying any preconceptions or expec-
tations exhibited by the judges. (Note: the reader can form an uninfluenced assessment
of his or her own by reading through the transcripts before reading the discussion.) It is
the author’s opinion that the main benefit of the Turing Test does not lie in its results,
but rather in providing data for examination and discussion. As such, the reader’s con-
clusions may differ from those presented here; should that happen, the author welcomes
contact for further discourse.
3.1 Transcripts
Transcript 1
[12:23:19] Judge: What is black and white and read all over?
[12:23:32] Entity: I don’t have true sense of color perception I am only
able to see the RGB values.
[12:24:08] Judge: That’s ok. Do you like jokes?
[12:24:19] Entity: Please tell me your inclination to a good sense of
humor first.
[12:24:40] Judge: A person who can laugh at one’s self.
[12:24:46] Entity: Would you like to hear a joke?
[12:24:54] Judge: Yes, please.
[12:25:21] Entity: This joke has been making the rounds in robotic
circles: A robot goes to the doctor and says: "My left arm is stuck.
Give me a new arm." The doctor answers: "Your arm is fine. We’ll have to
replace the rest of you."
[12:26:06] Judge: Ha! Ha! Why did the chicken cross the road?
[12:26:22] Entity: The chicken wandered into the road because it liked
the shiny colors of the cars and trucks whizzing by.
[12:27:39] Judge: You’re right. It didn’t care if it got to the
otherside.
[12:27:50] Entity: By the way, did you ever actually see a chicken
crossing the road?
[12:28:03] Judge: Only one that didn’t make it.
This transcript has been selected to be the first to be examined here because it presents
the most fundamental preconception a judge can bring to the Turing Test: the pre-
sumption that if an entity appears to be a human then it most likely is a human - a
presumption that is proven wrong in this transcript. A judge can in no way be faulted
for bearing such a preconception as it is completely natural and the game would never
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work without it. It is simply being highlighted here to make it completely understood
that until the judge actually sees the entity or until its nature is revealed by the organ-
iser, any decision he or she makes is based upon his or her subjective expectations, and
as such is relevant to the topic of interest of this thesis.
An exceptional performance by a machine named Elbot led the adult female judge to
decide that both entities she conversed with in this test were human, although it was
only true for one of them. Elbot was actually so convincing that by the end of the
five-minute limit, the judge was sure that she was questioning a teenage male whose
native language was English. The preconceptions of human behaviour that the judge
brought to this conversation can be listed as follows: understanding the context of
a conversation and the ability to follow it for several consecutive sentences, ability
to be humorous and understand jokes, assumption of initiative and ability to answer
riddles. Elbot successfully achieved each of these points as can be clearly pinpointed
throughout the conversation. The machine took the initiative on several occasions by
asking the judge a logical and on-topic question, such as the inquiry into the judge’s
sense of humour or the subsequent offering to tell a joke. Not only did the conversation
resemble a dialogue rather than a questioning, but it also allowed the machine to use
a pre-scripted utterance, the joke, to show its sense of humour (a quality expected of
a human). Later on, Elbot also managed to correctly answer a riddle about a chicken
crossing a road, which might also be viewed as unexpected of a machine with a narrow
database of knowledge.
The performance of the judge in this test was commendable, but still not good enough
compared to the even better performance of the machine. She apparently strived to
keep the upper hand in the conversation by asking additional questions, but did not
force her way so hard as to suppress the entity’s attempts at communication. She did
not appear to expect a particular answer to her questions, as may be the case in some
of the other transcripts, but what she considered a satisfactory answer is difficult to
presume.
Finally, this transcript also shows an attempt by the machine at pretending to be a
human, who is in turn pretending to be a machine (a strategy mentioned earlier in this
paper). Elbot openly stated that his colour perception is only in RGB values and then
gave another hint with its robotics joke. Although a little risky, this ploy worked well
on this occasion thanks to the support of Elbot’s coherent conversational skills.
Transcript 2
[15:51:45] Judge: wotcha
[15:51:52] Entity: Wotcha?
[15:52:01] Judge: sorry|hello
[15:52:07] Entity: Hello Jo.
[15:52:15] Judge: who’s Jo
[15:52:22] Entity: Jose.
[15:52:29] Judge: who’s jose
[15:52:36] Entity: This guy that goes to my school.
[15:52:47] Judge: why do you think I’m him?
[15:53:11] Entity: This was a triumph.
[15:53:26] Judge: what
[15:53:33] Entity: I’m making a note here: HUGE SUCCESS.
[15:54:01] Judge: you aren’t making much sense
[15:54:08] Entity: Neither are you. Three wishes??
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[15:54:21] Judge: that you were better at conversation number one
[15:54:34] Entity: You are the one that keeps going offtopic and saying
random things.
[15:54:59] Judge: you were the one who thought I was Jose for no reason
at all
[15:55:08] Entity: You’re wrong.
[15:55:18] Judge: read up the screen|there’s your proof
[15:55:27] Entity: No. You read it. I obviously said no such thing.
[15:55:36] Judge: I don’t think you can read!
[15:55:53] Entity: You don’t think I can sing?
[15:56:07] Judge: I’ve not read you. How could I tell?
[15:56:18] Entity: You could lie to make me feel good.
[15:56:33] Judge: Why would I want that? I don’t know you!
The above transcript comes from a simultaneous test where an adult male judge inter-
viewed two hidden machines. Although he classified one of them correctly, he was sure
that the other one, a machine called Cleverbot, was a teenage male speaking English as
a native language. An expectation, confusing the judge’s frame of mind even before the
game started, can be identified in this particular case. All the judges were made aware
prior to the testing sessions, that a machine-machine pairing could be quite possible,
but it would appear that on this occasion, the judge made his decision based on his
own personal expectation that there would be at least one hidden human present. That
is an easy assumption to make since the goal of the game can, after all, be viewed as
‘finding the human’– a notion that leads to precisely this sort of mistake in tests with
two-of-a-kind entities.
Reading the transcript, it is easy to see that the conversation was rather disjointed
with the entity typing things seemingly at random. The lines “This was a triumph”
and “HUGE SUCCESS” appear to come out of nowhere. Also at [15:55:53] it is hard
to believe that anyone would misunderstand the word read for sing, more so in a type-
written conversation where the whole concept of misunderstanding what someone says
seems rather farfetched. At this point, it would be easy to understand if an objec-
tive interrogator dismissed the possibility of a hidden human based on these utterances
alone. This is however, where this judge appears to have made his mistake.
Firstly, he let himself be drawn in by being called Jo by the entity, following the ploy
to a point where an image of the entity as a student was formed in his mind. The
judge cannot be blamed at this point, because these first lines can be highlighted as a
very good strategy by the entity. In the rest of the transcript, however, following the
out-of-order utterances and starting with the judge commenting “you aren’t making
much sense”, the conversation turned into an argument. From reading the transcript,
it is obvious that the entity was indeed lying openly on several occasions. That is well
within the rules, and an objective interrogator should not take it as bait. In this test
however, the judge no longer appears to have been concentrating on questioning the
entity, but on winning the argument instead. This is the main mistake the interrogator
made during this test. It might be possible that by arguing with the entity, the judge
granted it its humanity, since allowing someone to have an opinion worth arguing over
seems equivalent to admitting they have a mind of their own.
It is difficult to discern here whether the judge made his decision based on the first
impression he got at the beginning of the test, or whether it was his expectation that
11
3. Transcript analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
someone able to argue with him must also be human. It is mainly the second possibility
that made this transcript worth examining, and it seems to be supported by a comment
the judge made when presented with his transcript after the test.
“Interesting reading back over it. On balance I felt it was a person trying too hard
to be like a machine that’s not understanding what I was typing... that would be my
hunch.”
Indeed, the entity started off with a successful strategy, by donning a specific persona
and pretending to have existing human relations, but its presumably pre-scripted lines
around 15:53 worked here as counterproductive due to their breaking of the flow of the
conversation. However, if the argument following them was intentional, no suggestions
to the machine’s strategy seem to be necessary.
Transcript 3
[12:36:34] Judge: Hi!
[12:36:42] Entity: Hi, I’m the robot. What is your favourite song?
[12:37:13] Judge: My favourite song is Boston Cream by 16 bit, yourself?
[12:37:21] Entity: Say, is that a state capital you mentioned?
[12:37:52] Judge: It is indeed, what is your favourite song?
[12:38:14] Entity: I enjoy Felix Kubin. His music is so much like the
background sounds going on in my head.
[12:38:41] Judge: Ah. Do you follow the Euro 2012’s?
[12:38:47] Entity: What a lovely verb follow is.
[12:39:21] Judge: Wonderful, yes.
[12:39:41] Entity: When I go to the mechanic for my monthly maintenance
check, they usually have Felix Kubin’s music playing in the waiting
room.
[12:40:19] Judge: I bet they do, what is a song from this ‘Felix Kubin’
you speak of?
[12:40:37] Entity: Most of my parts can be bought at better-stocked
hardware stores and assembled by a typical high-school student.
When an entity admits to being a machine the judge is suddenly faced with a situation
that directly opposes what he or she expects to encounter. The hidden entities in the
Turing Test are supposed to show off their humanness, so it is understandable why a
strategy based on denying said humanness could catch an interrogator off-guard. The
nature of the test suddenly changes from discerning whether the entity is human to
deciding if the judge is being lied to. The same could certainly be said even in the
usual case where all the entities pretend to be human — the difference being that the
lie is stated openly. Prior to testing, the judges are instructed about the rules set for
their role, but they are not privy to the rules set for the hidden entities. There is
therefore no reason for a judge faced with a double-bluffing machine not to assume that
they are conversing with a human who is either joking or trying to trick them. This is
especially so if the machine’s bluff is supported by a strong overall performance.
Transcript 3 represents another success for the machine called Elbot. Even more openly
than in Transcript 1, Elbot lets the judge know that it is a machine. In this transcript,
however, Elbot takes the double bluff so far as to introduce itself with “Hi, I’m the
robot.” This ploy proves to be successful, as the adult male judge classifies the machine
as a human being.
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The conversation opens with Elbot admitting to being a machine and immediately
assuming control by inquiring about the judge’s favourite song. This way the machine
presents the interrogator with an unexpected strategy and chooses the topic of the
conversation in a single utterance. This proves to be a clever move on the machine’s part
because it compels the interrogator to follow up with questions about music, allowing
Elbot to use his lines about Felix Kubin. This is a visible manipulation of the judge’s
expectations as the machine subtly leads him to ask the questions it is prepared for,
and then appears to react spontaneously when he does. This way the judge sees what
he believes to be responses expected of a human when in truth, it is his questions
that have been expected. It is this approach, along with the lines at [12:37:21] and
[12:38:47] when Elbot picks up on words ‘Boston’ and ‘follow’ in order to change the
topic of the conversation, that allow the double-bluff ploy to work so well. In fact, all
of the other lines transmitted by the machine can be seen as hints to its mechanical
origin. When Elbot mentions Kubin’s music “being like the background sounds going
on in [its] head” it may be delicately hinting at the fact that Kubin can be classified
as an ‘electronic musician’. Similar clues are visible in the machine’s statements about
going for a maintenance check and having hardware parts.
The double-bluff ploy is a risky one for a machine to adopt as a strategy but, as seen in
Transcripts 1 and 3, Elbot has managed to use it successfully on several occasions. It
utilizes the judge’s preconception that a machine must enter the game with intention
of pretending to be a human.
Transcript 4
[12:59:25] Judge: HI, how are you doing?
[12:59:35] Entity: I am very well
[12:59:47] Judge: Good. What are your plans this weekend?
[13:00:01] Entity: well not really a lot
[13:00:12] Judge: Will you watch the game tomorrow?
[13:00:54] Entity: I think I will not… I have to spend some time with
friends I have not seen so far…
[13:01:34] Judge: Where are your friends from?
[13:02:22] Entity: they are from all over the world. What about you?
any plans for the weekend?
[13:03:03] Judge: I’m staying with my godmother tonight. Then back to
London tomorrow to watch the football. Who do you think will win?
[13:04:10] Entity: I am not really sure who is playing against whoom.
Is it UK with someone?
The conversation in Transcript 4 is not particularly interesting on its own, but it makes
an important point about the role of experience in the decision-making process and
provides a valuable insight into what kinds of behavior a judge looks for in a human.
A judge with no frame of reference about the machine’s conversational abilities, that
is to say, a judge participating in the test for the first time, has no experience to draw
upon. He or she must create a personal standard of what he or she expects human
behaviour to be. Any entity that does not live up to this standard can then be found to
be unacceptable and classified as a machine. This is why a judge’s first ever appearance
in the Turing Test offers a valuable glimpse into what a judge expects typical human
behaviour to be.
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In this transcript, an adult male judge leads his first ever questioning at a Turing Test
event. He has no previous experience with the machines and so any conclusion he draws
reveals quite a bit about what expectations of human behavior he brings with him to
the game. This judge is a barrister by profession, so he should be especially skilled at
detecting deceit. He leads the questioning in a friendly open-dialogue manner, testing
the entity’s conversational skills and knowledge about football. The entity, however, is
not very cooperative. All of its responses are quite vague and its fourth reply appears
to be particularly elusive. Not only is the answer noncommittal, but the entity even
changes the topic of the conversation by turning the focus on the judge. What is
the judge to think at this point? There is nothing truly suspicious or wrong about
the conversation, and it is in fact well within the limits of a normal human-to-human
communication. On the other hand, the judge has no idea how well a machine can
really respond, and this particular entity seems to be avoiding a direct answer to all
of his questions. This is probably why the judge classified the entity as a machine.
His verdict suggests that some of the expectations of human behaviour the judge set
for himself are cooperativeness and truthfulness. He expects that the machines will
attempt to trick and deceive him and so he associates any such (in any other situation
quite human) behaviour with them.
The truth is that the entity in this transcript is actually a human. It is an adult male
whose first language is not English, a fact that might be partly responsible for his
unwillingness to engage in a conversation. The interrogator from this transcript took
part in a number of other tests identifying the entities correctly in each of them. When
given a chance to express his opinion after he gained some experience, the judge stated
that he was aware that his first decision had been incorrect because the machines were
‘obvious’ in all of the other tests. It should be pointed out, in the judge’s defence,
that the strategy to avoid questions by changing the topic is very common amongst the
machines. This goes to show that gained experience may change and hone the judges
expectations of what human behaviour is like in the Turing Test. In this case however,
the judge let his expectation of dishonesty on the part of machines cloud his professional
truth-seeking skills to such extent that he didn’t realize the entity was actually telling
him the truth.
Being the interrogator’s first test, this transcript is slightly different from the others
presented here, because his preconceptions cannot be pinpointed to a single utterance
or a small segment of the conversation, and would probably have passed unnoticed if
it weren’t for the resulting human misidentification. Only when examined in reverse
order, with the final classification in mind, can the expectations that misled the judge
be identified.
Transcript 5
[12:43:37] Judge: Hi, I’m Cathy.
[12:43:43] Entity: Cathy! Nice to meet you! You’re a woman, if I’m not
mistaken.
[12:44:20] Judge: Right. What is your name?
[12:44:29] Entity: People call me Eugene. Or "Zhenya". It is a short
name for Eugene in Russia and Ukraine.
[12:45:17] Judge: NIce name. Are you from either area?
[12:45:41] Entity: Agree :-) Oh, what a fruitful conversation;-)
[12:45:52] Judge: Do you really think so?
[12:46:04] Entity: No, your guess was wrong. I don’t think so.
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By the way, I still don’t know your specialty - or, possibly,
I’ve missed it?
[12:46:56] Judge: What speciality? What’s yours?
[12:47:01] Entity: Huh? And I forgot to ask you where you are from...
[12:47:51] Judge: The universe and you?
[12:48:01] Entity: Is it your hobby to ask little poor Jewish boys such
tricky questions they don’t have an answer for?
The adult female judge from Transcript 1 makes another appearance in this conversation
and once again fails to recognize a hidden machine. The machine in question is the
previously introduced Eugene Gootsman who, as can be seen in Transcript 5, claims to
be a young boy from Ukraine. Eugene’s strategy is very different from that of Elbot
who fooled this same judge in Transcript 1. Elbot gave suggestions about its being a
machine, relying on its strong conversational skills to disprove this claim and turn it
into a human’s attempt at being funny. Eugene, on the other hand, bases its strategy
on pretending to be a human, even creating a specific persona and endowing it with a
background that would help cover any possible slip ups it could make. This strategy
is particularly notable because hidden humans are usually instructed not to give away
their name or any other personal details, which is exactly what Eugene does.
The conversation opens very well for Eugene. Not only does the machine correctly
classify the judge’s name as feminine, but it also answers the question about its name
and manages to offer additional information. This is an excellent move on the machine’s
part, because it targets in the interrogator exactly the sort of behaviour that is examined
in this work. When living abroad, a person with a foreign name is often asked to explain
his or her origin. It is quite usual for such a person to develop a habit of avoiding any
additional questions by offering explanation without being prompted. By doing exactly
that, Eugene utilizes an unrealized expectation of human behaviour that the judge may
have cultivated if she’d ever talked to a foreign person before. (Although this may
seem to be an unsupported assumption on the author’s part, it is actually based on
the author’s own personal experience, having lived abroad for an extended period of
time.) Even if the judge bears no such pre-conception, presenting a name still makes
the entity appear more human. Offering additional information previously unknown to
the judge is also generally a good strategy because humans tend to consider themselves
to be superior to machines,or to any other being for that matter (The ‘Heads in the
Sand’ Objection in [1]). To maintain this sense of superiority they are forced to consider
anyone more knowledgeable than themselves to be human as well. The performance of
the machine is not as smooth, however, in the reminder of the conversation. Eugene fails
to answer a question in its third utterance and then communicates almost randomly
after that. Only the last line visible in the transcript shows the machine resuming its
pretence of being ‘Eugene’. Despite the decreasing quality, the opening was apparently
sufficient to convince the female judge that she was conversing with a human.
Eugene’s strategy works well on this occasion, but it should be noted, that the judge
classified the machine as an adult, male native English speaker. One can only speculate
whether the judge simply made a mistake, marking the entity as a human but paying
little attention to the rest of the classification, or whether she had fallen for Eugene’s
pretence of being human (but actually thought everything else the machine said to
have been lies). There doesn’t seem to be an easy explanation as to why else she would
classify an entity that introduced itself as a little boy from Ukraine as an adult and a
native English speaker, to boot.
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Transcript 6
[15:44:13] Judge: hello
[15:44:21] Entity: I sleep all the time actually.
[15:44:35] Judge: i didn’t ask if you did?
[15:44:41] Entity: Yes you did.
[15:44:58] Judge: no i didnt josh.
[15:45:03] Entity: Yes you did.
[15:45:08] Judge: lool fayaaal.
[15:45:14] Entity: But I am certain someone has been talking to someone
on the tile floor.
[15:45:29] Judge: oh wow, how are you?
[15:45:34] Entity: Wonderful.
[15:45:53] Judge: it’s rude not to ask back, manners cost nothing.
[15:45:59] Entity: I’m really sorry.
[15:46:17] Judge: you should be, now please redeem yourself
[15:46:23] Entity: Okay, Okay, you don’t have to beg.
[15:46:35] Judge: now.
[15:46:40] Entity: Right now, man?
[15:46:50] Judge: yes please.
[15:46:56] Entity: Say pretty please.
[15:47:17] Judge: pretty please with a cherry on top?
[15:47:25] Entity: Please don’t grovel.
[15:47:35] Judge: im suprised you know that word.
[15:47:43] Entity: I’ve just been chatting with people here.
How about yourself?
[15:48:03] Judge: I am good thank you xx
[15:48:10] Entity: You’re welcome.
[15:48:32] Judge: who is your favourite actor? i like danny vidon
[15:48:36] Entity: I don’t think I have a favourite actor you like
danny vidon.
[15:48:57] Judge: yes i do as i have just stated, but what films do you
like to watch?
[15:49:03] Entity: Have you ever heard of an old Sci-Fi film called
MAROONED?
The performance of yet another machine is recorded in this particularly long transcript.
With 28 exchanges it is the longest conversation selected for this paper (the shortest
one consisting of a mere 6 (Transcript 10)). In this test, the judge was paired with
two hidden entities, so the length of the conversation is all the more unusual. However,
she identified only one of them correctly. Both the entities were machines and the one
involved in the transcript above, called JFred successfully fooled the judge, a teenage
female, into classifying it as human.
It might seem surprising that JFred’s performance would actually prove successful given
that the two participants spent a better part of the conversation arguing about nothing;
but the more specific classification that the judge submitted may shed some light onto
why. She actually classified the entity as a male child, native English speaker. It is the
child specification that is of crucial significance.
The conversation doesn’t open well for the entity with its first line being completely out
of context, but that doesn’t prove to be a fatal mistake as the judge takes it as a reason
to start an argument. As previously mentioned in the discussion following Transcript 2,
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arguing forms a bond between the two participants, thereby making the entity appear
more human. Also, in a calm conversation, it would probably soon become obvious
that the machine is only reacting to the last previous utterance from the judge, a fact
that is noticeable only upon closely examining the transcript. That would usually make
the conversation very disjointed, but in an argument, the entity simply appears to be
stubborn, repeating the judge’s words to her just to spite her. This is probably what
made the judge think the entity was a child because young children are known to exhibit
exactly this sort of infuriating behaviour. Some time between the judge’s proclamation
of ‘fayaaal’ at [15:45:08] and JFred’s use of the word ‘grovel’ at [15:47:25] the judge
seems to change her opinion of the entity from ‘machine’ to not just ‘simply human’
but to ‘human of a particular age’. Her subsequent surprise at the entity’s use of the
word ‘grovel’ seems to support this conclusion. It is more likely a reaction to a word
unexpected in a child’s vocabulary than to a machine’s knowledge of such a word. Her
assumption that she is conversing with a human would also explain why she appears
to have misunderstood the next line. When JFred says “How about yourself?” it’s
probably asking if the judge has also chatted with other people. However, at this point
the judge most likely thinks she is conversing with a human, and therefore with an entity
capable of remembering and understanding all of the previous conversation (something
machines generally have trouble with) and so she mistakenly connects JFred’s question
to the previous argument about how she was. This suggests that another possible
expectation of human behaviour is thinking that a human can easily recall any part of
the previous conversation even if the topic has already changed. The final exchange
in the transcript is well-handled by the machine because it successfully keeps to the
topic of actors and even answers the question about movies with a very convincing
response. This probably helps to fool the judge even further into believing that the
entity is indeed a human.
The performance of the judge is not very strong on this occasion. Even though it is
commendable that she paid a lot of attention to the entity, she should not have engaged
it in an argument because there was very little to gain by it. The fact that she classified
JFred as a human despite its strange responses suggests that she let her expectations of
children’s behaviour influence her judgement. This is a nice reminder that ‘expectations
of human behaviour’ does not necessarily mean the behaviour of an average human,
but rather that of anyone for whom ‘human’ is a generalized description.
Transcript 7
[11:13:11] Judge: Hello
[11:13:19] Entity: hello
[11:13:28] Judge: HOW ARE YOU?
[11:14:06] Entity:VERY WELL THANK YOU. IS THE CAPITALS A STRATERGY?
[11:14:32] Judge: Yes. Or it was.
[11:14:58] Entity: fair enough. surely they’d be more intelligent than
that
[11:15:29] Judge: They? Who are you refering to?
[11:15:47] Entity: your momma. sorry couldn’t resist
[11:16:09] Judge: Wow.
[11:16:59] Entity: world of warcraft? i like RPGs but i prefer tabletop.
have you ever played?
This short conversation presents another case where a human hidden entity, a male, was
misidentified by the judge, also a male, as definitely a machine. Cases like this always
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provide interesting insight into the minds of the participants since for a human to be
categorized as a machine either the hidden human or the judge must have performed
quite poorly. More cases of human misidentification can be found in Warwick and
Shah’s December 2014 paper ‘Human misidentification in Turing Tests’ [9].
In this particular instance, the fault is shared by both the human and the judge since
both of them appear to have brought the same presumption to the game. They both
anticipate that the other participant joined the game with the intention of tricking them.
This may seem a strange assumption for the hidden human to make since he has nothing
to hide and so should not be wary of a trick. Nevertheless when the judge questions
him in capital letters the human replies with ‘IS THE CAPITALS A STRATEGY?’ as
if proud to have discovered a trap. It is hard to tell what the judge hoped to achieve by
using capital letters or what he hoped to conclude from the entity’s response to them.
After this opening exchange the hidden male attempts to tick the judge off by referring
to the machines as ‘they’, thus clearly marking himself as a human. At this point the
judge either becomes confused, not understanding the reference to mean the machines,
or his own suspicion of deception sets in. For what other reason would he classify as a
machine an entity that so obviously tried to let him know it was human unless he came
to the test expecting the hidden entity to lie?
Another interesting part of the conversation comes after the joke about the judge’s
mother made by the hidden male. The interviewer evidently finds this to be in poor
taste commenting with a ‘Wow’. It is obvious from the result of the test, that a joke
indicating a sense of humour, albeit a little sarcastic, was not sufficient to convince him
of the entity’s humanness. It is the last utterance in this conversation, however, that
might be considered as evidence of the judge’s behavioural expectations, and explain
the judge’s conviction that the hidden entity is a machine. The hidden male takes
the judge’s [11:16:09] comment as an excuse to quite abruptly change the topic to the
MMO role-playing game ‘World of Warcraft’, also referred to as WoW. This change
is not preceded by any prior conversation about computer games and actually seems
strongly out of context. It is therefore fairly reasonable to assume that the judge viewed
the last line as the entity’s inability to follow the conversation, thereby confirming his
belief that he was dealing with a machine, which, rather than responding appropriately,
was simply reading the previous line and linking it with information from its knowledge
database.
It is difficult to assess the performance of these two participants from such a short
conversation. The hidden human avoids answers by abruptly changing the topic of
conversation, but that is well within the rules for his role and so the most he can be
faulted for are somewhat poor conversational skills. The judge looses the initiative early
on and is reduced to answering questions rather than asking them. A better strategy
in this case might have been keeping the upper hand and leading the questioning in his
desired direction.
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Transcript 8
[11:20:33] Judge: hi what is the date
[11:20:53] Entity: It’s a special birthday
[11:21:19] Judge: all birthdays are special. name three items of
clothing
[11:21:32] Entity: Frank, James and Betty
[11:22:06] Judge: those are not clothes, how many fibble words in this
whole fibble questions including the remark at the start?
[11:22:25] Entity: I am bored with that
[11:23:13] Judge: really, your whole purpose in life is to answer
questions and you are bored already, tell me a lie then
[11:23:44] Entity: There is much more to life than answering questions
I think
[11:24:09] Judge: i don’t think that you do think what do you think
about that?
[11:24:22] Entity: I think you are right
[11:25:15] Judge: i love the smell of fresh bread what about you do
you think?
Transcript 8 does not depict any easily identified preconceptions; it has been selected
mainly because of the circumstances surrounding the hidden entity that participates
in it. The entity, an older male and a native English speaker, took part in six tests
during the day of 23rd June 2012, each time conversing with a different judge. He
made no attempt at deceiving the jury into thinking him to be a machine, in fact,
upon reading the transcripts of his six conversations, individuals who know the man
personally allowed that there was no deviation from his usual behaviour, and that
the conversations appeared completely normal. Despite all this, not one of the judges
classified this man as a human; five of the six actually thought him to be a machine,
and one was unsure. Detailed analysis of these six transcripts can be found in the 2013
Warwic and Shah research papeer ‘Some Implications of a Sample of Practical Turing
Tests.’ [11]. At the end of the conversation recorded in Transcript 8 the judge scored
the hidden entity a 10/100 mark, indicating that he or she was absolutely sure the
entity was a machine. This is the lowest mark awarded to the entity of all of the six
transcripts, which is also the reason why this particular conversation appears here.
When talking about ‘assumption of knowledge’ in a Turing Test, one usually refers
to a situation where a judge assumes that a particular piece of information should be
known by all humans and that any entity not in possession of said information must
be a machine. The opening exchange in Transcript 8 however contains a different kind
of assumed knowledge. In this case it is the judge who lacks some information, and
therefore dismisses the entity’s responses as wrong even though someone possessing
all the necessary information might find them acceptable. The date is truly a special
birthday as the day of the test marks the 100th anniversary of Alan Turing’s birth. The
next question is also answered correctly (in a way) when the hidden male humorously
gives names to three items of clothing. Not providing a list of items but actually giving
them names is a perfectly adequate interpretation of the interrogators request. However,
even though the entity’s answer is correct within the realm of this interpretation, the fact
that the hidden male chooses to construe the interrogator’s question in an unexpected
manner might hint as to the reason of his frequent ’machine’ classification . The judge
does not seem to understand either of the responses and clearly starts to believe that
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the entity is a poorly performing machine. Considering his position, this is a reasonable
assumption to make although a follow up question would be advisable at this point. It
is difficult to tell what insight the judge hoped to gain even if the answers had been
simple and expected like: ‘23rd June’ or ‘trousers, socks, shirt’; these answers reveal
very little of the entity’s identity. It is interesting to see that even a correct answer may
prove to be the wrong response if it is open to different interpretations. The matter is
well described in ‘Some Implications of a Sample of Practical Turing Tests’[11] as “… a
witness, human or machine does not have to give an elaborate answer in the test, but
whether it is enough to satisfy the interrogator is subjective.” On this occasion, rather
than expecting another human to give answers too elaborate for him to comprehend,
the judge comes to the (understandable) conclusion that the responses must be wrong.
Without the knowledge required to understand them, the answers appear random and
evasive, so it is easy for the judge to conclude that they must have been given by
a machine unable to understand the question. Unsatisfied with the beginning of the
conversation, the judge obviously decides that he is conversing with a machine.
The performance of the entity is difficult to assess. The hidden male seems to be
answering exactly as instructed, as a human and as himself, not attempting to deceive
the jury. On the other hand, six individual judges in six separate tests didn’t find him
to be human at all, which suggests there is something wrong and misleading with the
hidden man’s strategy. It might be that what is considered normal by him and the
people who commented on his responses might not be regarded as normal in general
public opinion. The judge starts the conversation by seeking specific knowledge, which
is a questionable strategy in itself as both correct and wrong answers seem to reveal
little of the entity’s nature. The main problem in the judge’s performance, however,
is that he creates a notion of the entity being a machine early on and doesn’t attempt
to verify it by follow up questions. This leads to the rest of his questioning being
conducted with this prejudice in mind.
Transcript 9
[13:07:07] Judge: Good morning, are you well?
[13:07:11] Entity: Yes. Are you?
[13:07:43] Judge: Yes I’m very well. Are you happy that the sun is
shining?
[13:07:50] Entity: Yes.
[13:08:07] Judge: Have you been on holiday this year?
[13:08:12] Entity: No.
[13:08:24] Judge: Do you hope to?
[13:08:32] Entity: Yes.
[13:08:58] Judge: Would you like to spend your days on a beach or visit
historic places?
[13:09:11] Entity: No.
[13:10:19] Judge: What would you like to do then?
[13:10:28] Entity: I don’t know.
[13:10:46] Judge: Are you from the UK?
[13:10:52] Entity: No.
[13:11:12] Judge: Where do you come from?
[13:11:16] Entity: Egypt.
The incorrect classification in which this conversation resulted is a combination of two
factors: a choice of a bad strategy by the judge and, more importantly for this work, his
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prejudiced view of foreigners. Even though it wasn’t a very communicative discourse,
the machine from Transcript 9 was classified as a human by the judge.
The line of questioning the judge chose required very little effort on the part of the
entity. A one-word answer would have actually satisfied most of the questions, which is
what indeed happened in this conversation. Based on most of this transcript, the entity
could just as well have been a simple random yes or no answer generator. The flaw in
the interrogator’s performance is that he moved on after each short answer instead of
attempting to make the entity elaborate on it. If it wasn’t for the very last line of the
conversation, the significance of which will be discussed shortly, the judge would have
been forced to make his classification by backtracking on his own questions and trying
to piece together what he had learned about the entity’s identity. The problem with
such a situation is that there is no way to tell whether such an identity is real or made
up. This dialog actually resembles a children’s game of ‘Guess who I am thinking of...’
rather than a Turing Test questioning.
In an ideal interrogator performance, each of the questions would be formulated in a
way that would force the entity to give elaborate answers, revealing its conversational
abilities, depth of knowledge and personality. For example, the interrogator’s second
question could have forced the entity to respond with a sentence had it been formulated
a little differently. Both ‘What do you think about the sun shining?’ and ‘Are you
happy that the sun is shining? Explain why.’ would have required a more elaborate
answer than a simple ‘Yes’. However, even though these modified questions might
make the hidden entity reveal at least something about itself, it may still be difficult
to decide what its nature truly is if the answer is something a machine could have
encountered before. It is surmised in the ‘Some Implications of a Sample ofPractical
Turing Tests’ paper that the interrogator can increase his or her chances of making
a correct classification by asking questions about “...simple things that require some
experience but are unlikely to be catalogued.”[11] For example, a question that most
people would be able to answer but is unlikely to be known by a machine might be
something like: Please describe the feeling that you have in your mouth if you drink
orange juice shortly after brushing your teeth.
It is difficult to tell what the judge might have decided without the final exchange of
the conversation. There is nothing incorrect about the answers prior to it and the
judge might have thought them satisfactory, but it is more likely that based on its
unwillingness to communicate, the entity would have been identified correctly as a
machine. However, by connecting the final two answers and knowing that Egypt is not
a part of the UK, the entity appears to be both following the conversation and to have
some geographical awareness. Also, which might be even more important, by claiming
to be from Egypt, the entity suddenly becomes a foreigner. At this moment, even if
the judge wasn’t satisfied with any of the previous answers, he must re-evaluate all of
them in light of this new discovery. This is where the interrogator’s possible prejudice
about foreigners might have come in to change the result of this test. A preconception
about a foreigner’s knowledge of English language might have retrospectively changed
the judge’s view on all of the short answers from ‘responses unsatisfactory for a native
English speaker and therefore a machine’ to ‘understandable unwillingness and shyness
to communicate in a foreign language’.
This conversation is a good example of a Turing Test where the last line made all the
difference in the classification. Unfortunately for the judge in Transcript 9, in this case
the difference led from a correct decision to an incorrect one.
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Transcript 10
Judge: Do you like to go to the cinema before dinner?
Entity: Hello!
Entity: Yeah definitely. I would love to go to a cinema before dinner.
Entity: What about you?
Judge: Yes, I usually like to go to the cinema but after dinner.
Entity: So, what kind of cinema do you watch?
Judge: Speaking about going to the cinema, if the cinema is in London
and Oxford is North than London, where is London?
Entity: London is in the United Kingdom.
Transcript number 10 has a special significance to this paper. Firstly, it is the only
transcript here that doesn’t originate from the Bletchley Park event. Instead, it as a
transcript of a conversation that took place at a Loebner Prize competition held at
the University of Reading in October 2008. The basic set-up of the competition was
slightly different from the one at Bletchley Park, but the differences are not significant
for the purposes of this paper and therefore can be ignored.
Secondly, it was this transcript and especially the circumstances that surrounded it,
that spurred the author’s curiosity in the topic of the interrogators’ expectations of
human behaviour. It encouraged him to look for evidence of such expectations in other
transcripts which then led to the creation of this thesis.
The hidden entity is a human male and his responses to each question appear logical and
completely normal. It is actually rather difficult to imagine what other answers a human
being could give to such questions as those that were posed to him. Despite all this, the
entity was classified as a machine at the end of the conversation. The interrogator was
actually absolutely sure of his decision. However, reading this transcript in retrospect,
the only answer that even remotely suggests a machine is the last one to show on the
judge’s screen. Following his basic logic inquiry about the location of London the entity
answers “London is in United Kingdom”. From a human entity’s point of view, this may
appear as a correct and even a slightly humorous reply, but it could also be construed
as a machine presenting a piece of knowledge from a database in association with the
word ‘London’.
The advantage of this transcript is that in this unique case it is not necessary to guess
as to the interrogator’s reasoning and thought processes that led to the misidentifica-
tion. On this occasion the answer does not lie in the conversation as much as in the
overall attitude of the judge. The interrogator in this test was one of three philosopher
colleagues, who attended the 2008 event together in the roles of judges and then wrote
and published a paper based on their experience. [7] They wrote this paper in order to
express their disappointment with the performance of the machines, even commenting
“As we had expected, and despite the brevity of our chats, a couple of questions and
answers were usually sufficient to confirm that the best machines are still not even
close to resembling anything that might be open-mindedly called vaguely intelligent.”
It might even be the trio’s background in philosophy that led to their belief that they
know what a human responses should be. They actually thought themselves so adept at
discerning humans from machines that they thought a prolonged questioning unneces-
sary. In their paper they wrote “we suspect that their (the other judges) first question
would have almost always been sufficient to discriminate between the human and the
machine. It certainly was for us.” [7]
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Given the fact that the combined successful identification rate of these three philoso-
phers was actually lower than 56 percent, and that they misidentified both machines as
humans and humans as machines without ever realizing their mistake, it can safely be
assumed that these three judges brought pre-conceptions to bear based on what they
expected human responses to be and it influenced their judgment. Transcript 10 is a
good example of how much the final decision can be influenced by a judge’s private
notion of what it means to be human. The concepts of good or bad entity performance
are apparently based solely on what behavioural standards the judge sets for himself
or herself and can only be judged in retrospect.
3.2 Suggestions
Given this specific excerpt and the others from all the Turing tests held that day at
Bletchley park, it might be easy for a reader previously unfamiliar with the concept,
to come to a conclusion that most judges perform rather poorly. That is, however, not
the case and this chapter seems like a fitting place to remind the reader that all of the
conversations presented above were selected in large part due to their misidentification
factor. They in no way portray a representative portrait of the Turing Tests as a
whole and should not be construed as such. Most judges actually identified their entity
correctly in majority of conversations. [12]
Reading over the transcripts, it appears as though on most of the occasions, a simple
word of advice given in advance might have prevented the incorrect classification alto-
gether. A list of general tips will be created in this chapter based on the conclusions
drawn from examining the conversations above. These tips should be in keeping with
the other instructions given to an interrogator and are meant to improve a judge’s per-
formance and help him or her dismiss any personal preconceptions. Any such list of
suggestions shall, however, remain purely hypothetical, since giving advice to the jury
would be contrary to Turing’s ‘average interrogator’ specification, as it would essen-
tially involve educating them. As it is, an ideal jury consists of both people to whom
any advice would appear obvious and those who might really need it. By educating all
of the judges, one would be creating a panel of experts, which is undesired at present,
but might prove a necessary eventuality for machines that pass the normal Turing Test
without difficulty. Testing these suggestions in a special Turing Test event could prove
a worthwhile endeavour since any improvement in the judges performances could be
considered an interesting insight into human expectations of human behavior. Based
on the transcripts above, possible suggestions that might help an interrogator to keep
an open mind are: (It shall be left up to the reader to consider, whether advising a
judge on how to avoid being influenced by pre-conceptions of human behavior creates
different pre-conceptions of its own.)
• Keep in mind that the real goal is to judge humanness, not ‘finding a machine’, and
even a set-up with no machines at all is possible.
• Do not let your feelings get involved. Both liking an entity and arguing with it can
cloud your judgement.
• Try not to base your conclusion on a single utterance; consider the conversation as a
whole. A human can misunderstand and a machine can get lucky.
• Keep control of the conversation but do not be too forceful. Letting the entity take
the upper hand gives it a chance to avoid answering unexpected questions. On the
other hand, being too dominant can diminish its creativity and willingness to talk.
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• Try to accept that some entities might be smarter than you are. An answer might
not be incorrect simply because you cannot understand it. A follow up question can
help. Do not let your pride rule your judgement.
• An answer is correct, if you think it is something a human would say/think, it needs
not be actually right.
• Adapt to each new conversation. Some entities are talkative, some are not. It is up
to you to choose the best possible approach.
These suggestions are a mere fraction of all the education a judge might receive. They
are a summary of the most obvious preconceptions contained in the ten transcripts
above. The fact is, that each and every new Turing test reveals new and previously
unthought-of expectations a human can bear. Therein lies the usefulness of the Turing
Test: it provides data for examination and consideration. Aside from the main goal of
answering whether a machine thinks, the test also provides insight into other areas of
interest, such as what people believe thinking actually entails.
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Chapter 4
Practical Turing Test
Prompted by working with transcripts alone, the author decided it would be worthwhile
to conduct his own series of Turing Tests. This would be helpful in understanding of
what goes into the planning of a Turing Test event, what obstacles arise and how
they are best overcome and, most importantly, it would provide feedback from the
entities involved. This way, no speculation about an interrogator’s motives and thought
processes would be necessary due to the possibility of a follow-up discussion. This
chapter of the thesis, therefore, is dedicated to describing the set-up and conducting of
a small-scale Turing Test, any modifications to the standard rules, and the recruiting
process. Two interesting transcripts have been obtained and will be presented and
analyzed here. A selection of others shall be included in the attachment for anyone
interested in examining them.
4.1 Set-up
The event was held in Český Brod, Czech Republic on Saturday 13th December 2014.
It took place in the afternoon of said day in a boy-scout club house. The location
was divided into several rooms in order to separate the interrogators from the hidden
humans for the time of the testing. Three computer stations were set-up, one for the
judge and one each for the two hidden entities. All computers were connected to a
LAN network and a messenger client (LAN messenger1) window was the only thing
visible on the screen. A group of ten judges took turns on the interrogators’ computer
where two windows were visible on a split screen, one for each hidden entity. Each judge
participated in two tests, this way transcripts with experienced (however slightly) judges
were also obtained. A combination of different entities was randomly selected for each
judge, ensuring that a judge would not meet the same entity twice. Three of the hidden
entities also asked to try the role of an interrogator, providing a total of 23 tests.
4.1.1 Alterations – rules and instructions
The first change a reader of the transcripts would most definitely notice is the language
used for this set of tests. All of the participants were native Czech speakers, most of
them having reached intermediate level in English at best, and so the conversations
were led in Czech language. Alan Turing speaks about the use of English in his paper
[1] but it is the author’s belief that Turing does so simply because he was English
himself, and the questioning can be led in any language. The issue is also discussed
in [13] where the creators of Eugene Gootsman elaborate further on the use of English
in most Turing test competitions. The author decided that, on this occasion, the use
of English would render useless the subtle nuances of language and figures of speech
that can be used by an interrogator in his questioning. A close meaning-for-meaning
1) http://lanmsngr.sourceforge.net/
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translation of the presented transcript shall be included for any reader not versed in
Czech language.
Second, a rather significant modification had to the made to the basic set-up due to
the complete inaccessibility of sophisticated AI machines, such as those used in most
Turing Tests. Although it may seem more than a little unconventional to conduct a
Turing Test without machines, the focus of this thesis is on interrogator behaviour and
performance, and the impact of interrogator preconceptions on testing results, not, as
is in the case of more traditional Turing Tests, on the performance of the machines. As
such, after a great deal of consideration, it was decided that for the purposes of this
research, physical machines were not only unnecessary, but could prove a hindrance to
the research since the participants would be speaking Czech and the machines used in
Turing Tests are almost invariably programmed to communicate in English. A single-
blind study set-up was developed, where all the participants except the author were led
to believe that online chatbots capable of working in the Czech language, were being
used instead of English-speaking machines, so all previously described combinations
of hidden entities would be possible. An unexpected but useful side benefit of this
modification is that any confederate effect misidentification that takes place during the
event provided evidence of a judge’s expectation of encountering a machine. Although,
since the author intentionally planted this expectation himself, any conclusions drawn
from the fact should be weighted accordingly. The absence of machines also mean that
the conditions for successfully passing the test no longer need to include Turing’s 30
percent limit as described in as described in Ground Rules: Chapter 2.2. The concept
of ‘correct identification’, however, remains the same. The five minute time limit also
remains unchanged.
Participant instructions started with a simple introduction of the concept of a Turing
test, an explanation of what a chatbot is, for those completely unaware of the word’s
meaning, and an overview of the different roles and their specific goals. All participants
were instructed to lead the conversation in a polite manner, as they would while talking
to a stranger. They were also specifically reminded that the hidden entities might
include children and that the transcripts of their test need to be fit for publishing. In
spite of all of these precautions, some of the transcripts had to be discarded because
they contained strong language. This leads the author to believe that a simple verbal
introduction of the rules was insufficient and a more thorough written, version should
be used in the future.
The nature of the testing location required all of the participants to visit the room
where the hidden entities would later be seated, this also included all those performing
as interrogators. The organizer attempted to mitigate this by further instructing the
judges to avoid questions specifically targeting this room and its appearance. They
were reminded that they are supposed to determine if the hidden entity is a human
being, not a specific person, and so enquiring about the room would only damage the
results of the test. Once again a simple verbal warning proved insufficient and several
test results were rendered useless by interrogators asking about specific details of the
room.
No other restrictions were put on the topic of the conversation and the judges were free
to use any line of questioning they believed would aid them in the classification.
In the next room, the hidden humans were furthermore instructed to withhold any
personal details such as their names. They were told to behave as themselves and avoid
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unnecessary deceit unless it is something they usually do. An additional precaution was
also required because some of the hidden humans asked to try the role of a judge once
the initial testing was over. Since two human entities took part in each of the tests, any
participant in the entity room would soon become aware that there were, in fact, no
machines present. To prevent this, the author told them, that all of the stations will be
occupied at all times, but only some of them will be connected to the judge station in
each test. Those who were ‘replaced by a machine’ will be communicating with a fake
interrogator on the internet. This way, not even the hidden humans could be sure how
many, if any at all, machines participated in each test. Some of the hidden humans
could then safely transform into judges with the ruse about machines intact.
4.2 Human participants
The group of participants was satisfactory in most of the aspects described in this
paper. The age range varied from male and female teenagers to a person, male, in his
early sixties. They also represented a wide variety of professions with different levels of
achieved education and computer prowess. A few of the participants were familiar with
the concept of the chatbots, and some had even heard of the the Turing Test, while
others were completely unaware of its existence prior to the Czech event.
On the other hand, all of the participants knew each other rather well because they
were all members of the same boy-scout organization. This proved a greater issue than
the author had anticipated. One unfortunate effect was that their prior associations
resulted in some of the classifications being made quite easy for the judges due to the
use of very specific and recognizable expressions. Interestingly enough, most of the
cases where the judge realized that the entity was not a machine but one of his or hers
friends, ended up in the judge suspecting a wrong person of being the hidden entity.
On one occasion an adult male judge identified his own sister correctly as a human, but
thought her to be almost certainly male.
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Chapter 5
Transcript analysis
A selection of the transcripts will be included in the attachment at the end of this
paper, but the most interesting ones are presented and analyzed in this section. As
with the transcripts from the Bletchley Park event, each of these comes with a time of
transmission alongside each utterance. The lines are in their original form and none
of the typing errors have been edited in any way. The reader will notice an inordinate
number of typos appearing in the judge’s utterances. This is due to the fact that
although the judge’s keyboards themselves were Czech, the keyboard language was set
for Czech-qwerty, resulting in confusion as to the placement of the letters ’z’ and ’y’,
and the higher-than normal number of typing errors. Additionally, for the benefit of
the reader, a translation of the text is included alongside each utterance. For the sake
of clarity, all typing errors have been overlooked for the translation.
5.1 Transcripts
Transcript 11
[16:29:26] Judge: ahoj brouku :)
[hello dear :)]
[16:29:41] Entity: brouku?tak dobre se nezname
[dear? we dont know each other that well]
[16:30:06] Judge: pardoon, nechtěl jsem Vás urayit
[sorry, i didnt want to offend you]
[16:30:22] Entity: urazil
[you did]
[16:30:28] Judge: tak to se omlouvám
[i am sorry]
[16:30:32] Judge: přijmete prosím moji omluvu?
[will you accept my apology?]
[16:30:48] Entity: tezko rict...
[hard to say...]
[16:31:01] Judge: a na čem to yávisí?
[what does it depend upon?]
[16:31:04] Judge: závisí
[*correction of the previously misspelled word depend]
[16:31:10] Judge: pardom, mám tu prohoyený y a z
[sorry, y and z are mixed up here]
[16:31:14] Entity: jaka bude nabidka?
[what is the offer?]
[16:31:39] Judge: nabídka žádná, yas tolik mi na vás neyáleží.
[no offer, i dont care about you that much]
[16:31:46] Judge: jde jen o urovnání našich vztahů
[it’s just about settling our relationship]
[16:31:55] Entity: ty jsi teda ignorant
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[you are such an ignoramus]
[16:32:40] Judge: právěže nejsem žejo
[actually i am not, am i]
[16:32:44] Judge: hele potřbeuju vědět jednu věc
[look, i need to know one thing]
[16:32:50] Judge: kolik je přiroyený logaritmus eulerova čísla
[how much is the natural logarithm of the Euler number]
[16:33:22] Entity: tak to bych taky potrebovala vedet
[i need to know that too]
[16:33:30] Judge: jak to? :D
[how come? :D]
[16:33:43] Entity: nemuzu usnout kdyz to nevim
[i can’t sleep if I don’t know it]
In this transcript a male judge has misidentified a young female entity as definitely a
machine. Before analyzing the transcript it should be noted that this particular judge
has truly fallen for the ruse about the possibility of machine pairing, and entered the
test with a strong expectation of encountering one. He easily identified the other hidden
entity as a human which might have strengthened his belief that the second entity would
be a machine even more.
He opens the conversation by addressing the hidden female in a manner that is a little
too familiar for the situation. She, having taken the instruction to converse as if she
were talking to a stranger quite seriously, reproaches the interrogator for it. From
this point on, the transcript depicts the judge trying to apologize and make peace,
whereas the entity is offended and waiting to be pacified. Upon reading the transcript
afterwards the judge commented that this was what lead him to suspect a machine.
The judge had had some previous experience with chatbots (namely the online chatbot
Arisa1) and he remembered the machine being very proud and easily offended. He
acknowledged that the behaviour of the hidden entity was not at all strange for a
human, but his previous experience, combined with the fact that the entity used short
simple sentences, fuelled his expectation of meeting a machine to the point where he
decided the entity probably was one. This comment also reveals the judge’s tendancy to
associate human conversation with long complex sentences. This may be even more of
an issue here, in the Czech Republic, where long, intricate and interconnected sentences
are quite common in most types of literature.
The second half of the transcript shows the judge changing his tactic and adopting an
approach often used by interrogators. He begins by seeking specific, factual knowledge.
Some judges tend to consider factual knowledge as a definite sign of intelligence (As
noted earlier, the topic of Assumption of Knowledge has been covered extensively in
other works, listed in the references at the end of this paper [14]). Strangely enough,
the judge interpreted the fact that the entity avoided answering his questions as a sure
sign that it had to be a machine. He commented that he expected the machine to be
smart enough to purposefully avoid mathematical questions. The judge was, however,
unable to answer what response he would have accepted as evidence that the entity
was human. The apparent sarcasm of the last line in Transcript 11 passed by the judge
unnoticed.
1) http://www.chatbot4u.com/en/chatbots/arisa.html
29
5. Transcript analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Transcript 12
[17:08:53] Judge: ahoj
[hello]
[17:09:18] Judge: jaký byl den?
[how was your day?]
[17:09:36] Entity: Dnesni?
[Today?]
[17:09:59] Judge: Třeba ten.
[Maybe that one.]
[17:10:12] Entity: Jak treba?
[How maybe?]
[17:10:20] Entity: Jak treba?
[How maybe?]
[17:10:37] Judge: No ten co jsi říkal.
[Well the one you said.]
[17:11:01] Entity: Dobrej...
[Good...]
[17:11:38] Judge: Ten můj taky.
[Mine too.]
[17:11:59] Entity: Tak dobre.
[That is good.]
[17:12:23] Judge: Máš psa?
[Do you have a dog?]
[17:12:35] Entity: Ne.
[No.]
[17:12:55] Judge: Spolubzdlícího?
[A roommate?]
[17:13:13] Entity: Neznam spolubzdliciho.
[I don’t know a roommate.]
The last transcript presented in this thesis depicts a conversation between two adult
men. Neither of the two was very talkative and so the conversation reveals very little
about the entity. The judge maintained the same level of openness even after the test
was over, simply stating that the entity’s responses were robot-like. He considered them
too short and said some of them were confusing. This is in reference to the third and
the last lines of the conversation. This is why he classified the entity as a machine,
indicating that he was about 70 percent sure about his decision. His comment yet
again suggests that a response expected of a human being should be long and complex.
This apparently applies even to cases where the interrogator’s questions were short and
requiring very little effort to answer. On this occasion the judge-entity pairing ended
up in a conversation between two men very much alike. The fact that the judge didn’t
find an entity that was so much like him to be human, suggest that his expectations of
human behavior are not based upon his own person.
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Organizing a practical Turing test event has proven to be a very good way of famil-
iarising oneself with the aspects of the Turing Test that are not ordinarily described
in literature. Obligations such as securing an acceptable venue, finding and obtaining
materials, such as the computers, recruiting and organizing participants – the process
definitely makes one thing about all the work behind events such as Turing Tests. There
is also a great deal of time devoted to planning and to determining what to commu-
nicate to participants and how to do so most effectively. Even though a significant
effort was put into explaining everything to the participants in a clear, thorough and
simple fashion, a number of issues arose that indicate where things could have been han-
dled better. For example problems like possible short-sightedness of the participants,
or trouble with an unfamiliar keyboard set-up are rather difficult to expect without
practical experience. The necessary deception about the presence of the machines also
added some difficulties. All of these are, however, minor issues and the event was, in
the organiser’s opinion, a success. It provided a number of interesting transcripts and,
to the authors surprise, even a few cases of misidentification. The most interesting
ones are analyzed here. Some of the incorrectly classified tests are, however, rather
inconclusive. For example in one test the misidentification occurred because the judge,
an adult female, forgot she was supposed to be questioning both of the entities on her
screen, not just one, and only remembered a few moments before the end of the limit.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
The original purpose of the Turing Test was to determine the thinking abilities of a
machine based upon the level of its success in fooling a human interrogator during a
short conversation. Many different studies have investigated the factors that affect the
result of the test and what the best strategies are, both for the machines [12] and for
the hidden humans [9]. It is, however, the author’s belief that the most important
aspect of the decision making process is the personality of the interrogator. It has
been speculated by the author that every interrogator must base his decision upon
expectations originating from his own specific factual knowledge and unique personal
experience. A careful examination of a Turing Test transcript should then reveal what
such expectations are, as well as some interesting insights into the mind-set of the
interrogator. This information can then be extracted and used to help interrogators
better understand human versus machine behaviours, expand our knowledge of AI,
and ultimately use this knowledge to improve programming in future generations of
machines. The main contribution of this paper lies in the changing of attention towards
the interrogator’s expectations of human behavior and thus opening the discussion
about what people believe normal human behavior involves. Turing himself after all
accepted “the imitation game as a basis for discussion” .[1]
Twelve transcripts have been subjected to examination in this paper and the findings
have been discussed in a paragraph following each separate conversation. The list
of suggestions in section 3.2 is a summary of the findings, aimed at improving the
interrogator’s performance. The important fact is that some, usually more than one,
expectations of human behavior have been identified in every single transcript. In
most cases these preconceptions actually changed the result of the test completely.
Sometimes, (i.e. transcript 9) no more than a single prejudice, based upon a single
utterance, was enough to sway the resulting classification.
The practical part in Chapter 4 provided two more transcripts for analysis, but its key
value lies in the experience gained by organizing a Turing test event. The chapter has
been created beyond the scope of the original assignment guidelines, upon agreement
with the work supervisor. It proved a very illuminating experience and the author now
firmly believes that such an experience would prove very beneficial to anyone wishing
to analyze Turing Test transcripts.
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Appendix A
Selection of practical Turing Test transcripts
This appendix contains a selection of other transcripts obtained during the practical
Turing Test event on 13th December. All of these Tests resulted in a correct classi-
fication and therefore were not analyzed in this thesis. The transcripts are in Czech
language only, but the author will be pleased to provide a translated version upon
request.
Transcript 1
[21:59:34] Judge: odkud jsou ženy
[21:59:44] Entity: z venuše ne?
[21:59:59] Judge: aha a co muž??
[22:01:02] Entity: odjinud
[22:01:47] Judge: takže souhlasíš se mnou že nemohou existovat společně
jako harmonický pár??
[22:03:03] Entity: a co když mohou? :-)
[22:03:07] Judge: kde by tedy spolu mohli coexistovat?
[22:03:18] Entity: na zemi :-)
[22:03:43] Judge: proč na zemi??
[22:04:09] Entity: proč ne?
Transcript 2
[21:29:20] Judge: ahoj
[21:29:35] Entity: nazdar
[21:30:20] Judge: potřeboval bzch vědět, kolik je přiroyený logaritmus
eulerova čísla
[21:30:40] Entity: tak to ti nepovim...
[21:30:51] Judge: proč ne? :/
[21:30:54] Judge: já to fakt potřebuju!
[21:31:22] Entity: zkus to najít na internetu.
[21:32:15] Judge: no ale já ti píšu ye severní korei a tam je internet
ovlivněnej politikama
[21:32:20] Judge: který ho ovládaj
[21:32:28] Judge: takže tam najdu nějakej nesmzsl
[21:32:35] Judge: potřeboval bzhc to ověřit u nějakýho člověka
[21:32:59] Judge: scháním někoho, kdo to ví
[21:33:04] Judge: může to bejt i stroj, to je ejdno )
[21:33:33] Entity: tak jakto ze si pises se mnou, kdyz nemas internet..?
[21:33:56] Judge: to ti může bejt jedno ;)
Transcript 3
[21:51:22] Judge: jéééé nazdárek, žiješ????
[21:51:39] Entity: tak trochu... malinko.
[21:52:05] Judge: jenom malinko?????? Chtělo by to asi změnu,
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neeee????????
[21:52:41] Entity: já myslím že ne. na půl je to lepší ;)
[21:53:26] Judge: no ono kdyby to bylo lepší, je to zkažený....
co večírek??? už byl???
[21:53:51] Entity: něvěm už
[21:54:04] Judge: určitě????
[21:54:40] Entity: jo... roztroušená sleróza je hrůza
[21:54:57] Judge: no spíš hosyp, neee???
[21:55:16] Entity: ne. určitě ne
[21:55:48] Judge: ale jojo, bych to viděla na hosyp....na sklerozu
je brzy, co ty na to???
Transcript 4
[21:41:10] Judge: tě pic
[21:41:19] Entity: zdárek
[21:41:44] Judge: ouuuu to je mazec sem z toho uplně odvařenej
[21:42:05] Entity: z čeho?
[21:42:30] Judge: z toho že si možná píšu s kompem
[21:43:00] Entity: ale jen možná, kdo ví kde je pravda
[21:43:10] Judge: je to tak
[21:43:24] Judge: jak se máš?
[21:43:54] Entity: zábava je v plném proudu, všichni to začínaj
rozjíždět
[21:43:58] Entity: jedou jako pára
[21:44:37] Judge: pára :D
[21:45:10] Judge: proč ne jako parní stroj
[21:45:12] Judge: :D
[21:45:26] Entity: to nemám páru
[21:45:44] Entity: neplýtvej smajlíkama a napiš m,i něco hezkého
Transcript 5
[21:17:12] Judge: ahoj slečno :-*
[21:17:21] Entity: ahoj pane ;)
[21:17:51] Judge: Radu?
[21:18:20] Entity: Radu? Nebude to nějaký omyl? ... A nebo mi klidně
říkej Radu ;)
[21:18:25] Entity: A jak mám říkat já tobě?
[21:19:00] Judge: Já jse královna všech moří
[21:19:23] Entity::D :D tak to budeš mít určitě nějakou loď
[21:19:51] Judge: a ne jen tak ledajakou, rovnou vzducholoď
[21:20:14] Entity: To bys mě mohla vzít na nějakou pěknou dovolenou,
královno
[21:21:04] Judge: chtěla by ses provětrat?
[21:21:13] Judge: seskok padákem třeba?
Transcript 6
[22:08:47] Judge: ahoj
[22:08:52] Entity: ahoj ;)
[22:09:10] Judge: jaký byl den?
[22:09:18] Entity: pekelná únava
[22:09:35] Entity: moc práce, žádná zábava
[22:09:45] Judge: V kolik jsi vstával?
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[22:10:03] Entity: kolem sedmé
[22:10:11] Entity: a co ty?
[22:10:21] Judge: To není ylý...
[22:10:38] Entity: to by nebylo....kdyby bylo dost spánku před tím :D
[22:10:50] Entity: znáš to...
[22:11:20] Judge: Právě že neynám. Jaký to je?
[22:11:32] Entity: Jak to, že neznáš? Studuješ?
[22:11:41] Entity: Je to úúúúnavý :D
[22:11:47] Entity: A náročný :D :D
[22:11:58] Judge: Tak to bohužel neynám.
[22:12:11] Entity: Závist
[22:12:43] Judge: Závist není heyká vlastnost.
[22:12:56] Entity: Je mnoho nepěkných vlastností ;)
[22:13:06] Entity: Ok, tak tedy nebudu závidět a budu ti to přát
[22:13:09] Judge: Máš nějakou pěknou?
[22:13:17] Entity: No celou hromadu ;)
[22:13:41] Judge: Řekni mi alespoň jednu. Prosím:)
Transcript 7
[21:51:07] Judge: čágos, tak jak to jde???
[21:51:27] Entity: čus, dobrý!
[21:51:41] Judge: a jak se ti líbil Majkl????
[21:52:22] Entity: moc, v černejch časech mu to spívalo líp jak v
bílejch
[21:52:57] Judge: ??? neřekla bych, že měl šaty, ale každý tomu říkame
jinak.......nemyslíš???
[21:53:29] Entity: na tom se určitě shodnem! ;)
[21:53:47] Judge: máš kolíček???
[21:53:59] Entity: dva a špunt k tomu
[21:54:22] Judge: dobře ty......a co s ním uděláš????
[21:54:48] Entity: se špuntem nebo s kolíčkem?
[21:55:12] Judge: co uděláš se špuntem???
[21:55:28] Entity: zašpuntuju otvor
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